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so procedurally defaulted, necessarily considered them
on the merits."
44
RI. Skipper's Lessons beyond Procedural Default
Although the decision in Skipper mainly turns on pro-
cedural issues, capital defense counsel can glean some
important practice points from it. First, defense counsel
should submit findings for inclusion in the court order.The
court's decision in Skipper and the court orders associated
1Id. at 612. In interpreting the effect of this decision, the
court of appeals factored in a certain long-standing practices of
the state supreme court. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
had a history of almost automatically denying petitions for certio-
rari where claims of procedural default were being upheld.The
court of appeals found no reason why the decision here did not
follow that pattern.
with it were evidence of how ambiguous court orders can
lead to misunderstandings of what has and has not been
considered by reviewing courts. Second, this decision is in
some ways a"wake-up" call to district judges, saying that the
procedural bar is not going to be accepted summarily each
time it is used to foreclose a claim. The court of appeals
fairly emphatically expressed dissatisfaction concerning the
lower court's hasty dismissal of all claims under the guise of
procedural default. Defense counsel can use the court of
appeal's discontent with such result-oriented jurisprudence
to argue that in order for a claim to be procedurally barred,
there must be a clear showing that the claim was rejected
on an "independent and adequate" state ground.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin
WATKINS v. ANGELONE
133 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1998)
United States Court Of Appeal, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On May 26, 1988,Wiflliam McCauley was found dead on
the floor of his Allied Services store in Danville, Virginia.
Witness information lead to the arrest of Ronald Watkins
shortly thereafter.Watkins was tried and convicted of capital
murder on September 28, 1988 and sentenced to death that
same day. Watkins' post-sentencing motion entitled "Motion
and Memorandum to Prohibit Imposition of the Death Penalty
on Grounds of its Arbitrary and DiscriminatoryApplication in
Violation of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution' 2 was denied after a hearing.
On direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court,Watkins
asserted racial discrimination in jury selection.3 Stating that
'Watkins v.Angelone, 133 E3d 920 (4th Cir. 1998).Watkins is
an unpublished disposition.According to Fourth Circuit Local Rule
36(c), "citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except
for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and
requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the
Fourth Circuit' The full opinion can be found at Watkins v.
Angelone, No. 97-9, 1998WL 2861 (4th Cir.Jan. 7, 1998).AUI subse-
quent citations to Watkins in this paper will use this electronic
database citation.
2Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *2 (citing J.A. at 220).
3Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *3. The court of appeals stated
that:
[o]n direct appeal Watkins argued that he was entitled to a
jury matching the racial composition of the community.The
Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that
Watkins made"no contention that the jury selection process
was unlawful and makes no showing of any policy of, or
effort toward, systematic exclusion" of blacks ....
Watkins had made no showing that the jury selection
process had been unlawful, the Virginia Supreme Court
rejected this argument,4 and the United States Supreme
Court denied his petition for certiorari.Watkins' subsequent
petition for state habeas corpus was denied; both the
Virginia Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 6 Watkins petitioned the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that racial discrimination
occurred in the selection of his jury, that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance, and that he was incorrectly
denied his right to inform the sentencing jury that a life sen-
tence would mean a minimum of twenty years in prison.The
district court denied the writ, and Watkins appealed to the
United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit. 7
Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *2 (quoting Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50, 53, 238 Va. 341, 346 (1989)).
However, in the immediately preceding paragraph, the court of
appeals itself summarized Watkins' post-sentencing motion as
asserting that "the jury was racially biased due to unlawful exclu-
sion of blacks from the jury pool' Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *2
(emphasis added). Setting aside the issue of whether Watkins
proved the systematic exclusion of blacks, in the court of appeal's
own words Watkins did argue that such exclusion occurred.
Despite this apparent contradiction, the court of appeals did not
reject the finding of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
'Watkins v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50, 53, 238 Va. 341,
346 (1989).
5Watkins v. Virginia, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990).
6Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *3.
71d.
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HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the writ of
habeas corpus, holding that (1) the jury selection pro-
cedure did not violate the Sixth Amendment;8 (2) the
jury selection procedure did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment; 9 (3)Watkins was not entitled to a new evi-
dentiary hearing on juror discrimination; 10 (4) there was
no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel;" and
(5) Watkins was not entitled to inform the jury that if
sentenced to life in prison, he would serve a mandatory
minimum of twenty years.12
ANAINSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Racial Discrimination injury Selection
A. Watkins' Sixth Amendment Claim
Watkins argued that the venire from which his
jurors were chosen was selected in a racially discrimi-
natory manner. His brief to the Supreme Court of
Virginia on direct appea' 3 stated that "reliance by the
state on voter lists for the venire, in light of the evidence
of lack of registration by minorities, created a prima
facie case" for a violation of the Sixth Amendment's" fair
cross-section requirement.
The court of appeals quoted Duren v. Missouri" as
the standard for a Sixth Amendment challenge to the com-
position of a jury pool. In Duren, the United States
Supreme Court stated that
the defendant must show (1) that the
group alleged to be excluded is a "distinc-
tive" group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair
8Watkins, 1998WL 2861, at *4.
91d. at *5.
'OId.
"Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *7-10.
1id. at *11.
"Watkins v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50, 238 Va. 341
(1989).
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have theAssistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. Const. amend.VI.
'1439 U.S. 357 (1979).
"'Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
and reasonable in relation to the number
of such persons in the community; and (3)
that this underrepresentation is due to sys-
tematic exclusion of the group in the jury-
selection process.
6
The court of appeals stated that "[o]nly the third ele-
ment is at issue here,"'7 implying that the first two
requirements of the Duren test were satisfied.
The court denied Watkins' argument, citing to two of
its own decisions, United States v. Cecil,8 and United
States v. Lewis, 9 a case which relied on the logic of
Cecil. In Lewis, the court summarized the holding of
Cecil as follows:
[w]e held that use of current voter registra-
tion lists as the source for a jury pool from
which random selection of jurors is made
presumptively provides a fair cross-section,
even if minorities are underrepresented on
those lists, as long as there is no affirmative
discrimination in registration.
20
The court in Cecil went on to say that "there is no
violation of the jury cross-section requirement where
there is merely underrepresentation of a cognizable
class by reason of failure to register, when that right
is fully open."
21
An argument can be made, however, that the court of
appeals misinterpreted both Watkins' claim and the third
prong of Duren. In Duren, the United States Supreme
Court found that the petitioner did meet the third prong
of the test. The court stated that the petitioner success-
fully made a showing that the underrepresentation of
women on the venire was "due to their systematic exclu-
sion in the jury-selection process'"22 The Duren petitioner
was able to make this showing because his evidence indi-
cated "that the cause of the underrepresentation was sys-
tematic - that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection
process utilized. 2' It is arguable that the jury selection
process used in Watkins' case was the decision to use
voter registration lists, not the generation of the voter reg-
istration lists themselves. Because there seems to be no
genuine dispute as to the existence of racial disparity in
the voter registration lists, the decision to use them to
generate venires made the underrepresentation in the
1
7Watkins v.Angelone, No. 97-9, 1998WL 2861, at *4 (4th Cir.
Jan. 7,1998).
"-836 E2d 1431 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205
(1988).
910 F3d 1086 (4th Cir. 1993).
2Lewis, 10 E3d at 1090 (citing Cecil, 836 E2d at 1448).
2tCecil, 836 E2d at 1448.
'Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,366 (1979).
3Id.
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venires "systematic - that is, inherent in the particular
jury-selection process utilized: 24 When analyzed from this
perspective, it appears that Watkins did meet the third
prong of the Duren test. However, counsel should be
aware that court of appeals still adheres to the holding of
Cecil.
B. Watkins' Fourteenth Amendment Claim
The Court used a similar analysis of Watkins' claim that
the underrepresentation of minorities in his venire violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendment.
21
The court quoted United States v. Miller"' for the applicable
standard: petitioner must establish that "(1) there is a cog-
nizable group, (2) that is substantially underrepresented by
reason of (3) a selection procedure that is not racially neu-
tral, i.e., is the result of intentional discrimination"'7As in the
SixthAmendment claim, the court of appeals stated that only
the third prong was at issue in Watkins.
The court cited United States v. Biagg2 as a situation
similar to Watkins. The Biaggi court held that petitioner
"made no claim that Blacks or Hispanics have been hindered
in registering to vote.They simply have chosen not to regis-
ter in the same proportion as Whites!'9 Thus the Watkins
court concluded that the same was true of Watkins' case: he
"did not present any evidence to the Virginia state courts
that the use of voter registration lists is'susceptible of abuse
2 nterestingly, the court of appeals in Cecil apparently invoked
an "it's their own fault" argument as to the underrepresentation of
minorities in voter registration lists and venires. The court stated
that the discrimination that Duren was concerned with was not
"any underrepresentation created simply because some members of
a class itself had by sloth failed to register." Cecil, 836 E2d at 1448.
This assertion misses the point in two ways. It might have some log-
ical force if the above-mentioned members had failed to register for
a (mythical) venire list, thus justifying the exclusion, but there is no
such list.Why should a failure to register to vote have any relation-
ship to the ability to sit on a jury? Second, the SixthAmendment sim-
ply does not mandate that a defendant is entitled to a trial by a fair
cross-section of his peers so long as a certain portion of those simi-
larly situated to defendant have registered to vote.
2SAil persons born or naturaUzed in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
26116 E3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997). Miller ultimately relied upon the
test as set out in Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1977).
-Miller, 116 F3d at 658.
23909 E2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990).
"Biaggi, 909 E2d at 677.
"Watkins v.Angelone, No. 97-9, 1998WL 2861, at *5 (4th Cir.
Jan. 7, 1998) (quoting Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494
(1977)).
or is not racially neutral."" The court of appeals' logic here
is flawed in an exactly analogous fashion to its analysis of
Watkins' Sixth Amendment jury race discrimination claim. If
it can be shown that the voter registration lists racially dis-
criminate by whatever mechanism, then the decision to use
the lists for the generation of venires constitutes"a selection
procedure that is not racially neutral:"3
C. Watkins' New Evidence
Watkins sought to introduce at the federal court level
new evidence of a statistical nature. Watkins asserted the
evidence would show systematic discrimination in the
selection of the venire and establish a prima facie case for a
violation of both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, because Watkins did not introduce this evidence
before the Virginia state courts, the court of appeals, citing
Correll v. Thompson,3 held that:
[w]hen the state has given a petitioner a full
and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed
to develop the material facts supporting it, he
is not entitled to develop further facts in a
federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he
demonstrates either cause for the failure and
prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamen-
tal miscarriage of justice. 3
The court of appeals found that Watkins received two
hearings on the matter, and so concluded that he in fact did
receive a full and fair hearing in the Virginia state courts."
Citing Murray v. Carrier,3 the court stated that in order
to show cause and prejudice, the petitioner must be able to
demonstrate "some objective factor external to the defense
[that] impeded counsel's efforts" to present the evidence in
the state courts.3 In addressing Watkins' claim that a trial
court denial of a continuance to gather more data was such
3tMille, 116 F3d at 658.
3263 E3d 1279 (4th Cir. 1995).
mCorrel, 63 E3d at 1288 (citing Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 8-12 (1992)).
mWatkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *5.Watkins received a post-sen-
tencing hearing regarding the exclusion of blacks from the jury
pool. However, evidence of such activity, by its nature, requires a
lengthy time period to collect, and the hearing was held within
too short a time for a meaningful gathering of evidence to occur.
Predictably, Watkins' motion was unsuccessful at the hearing.
Watkins then moved for a continuance for sufficient time to devel-
op proper evidence of exclusion of blacks from the jury pool.After
a hearing was conducted on the matter - this is the second hear-
ing to which the court of appeals refers - the motion for contin-
uance was denied. Letter fromWilliam S. Geimer, Professor of Law,
Washington and Lee University School of Law, to Craig Lane,
Associate Editor, Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, (Feb. 25,
1998) (on file with the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse).
35477 U.S. 478,488 (1986).
mWatkins, 1998WL 2861, at *5 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at
488).
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an objective factor, the court of appeals gave yet anoth-
er example of how procedural default is dangerous to
defendants. Although the court conceded that "[t]his
could constitute cause for a default,"37 the court never-
theless went on to say that, because the trial court
denial had not been cited as error before the Virginia
Supreme Court on direct appeal, the claim was thus pro-
cedurally defaulted. 8
With respect to the issue of a fundamental miscarriage
of justice, the court quoted Schlup v. Delo'9 for the propo-
sition that "the fundamental miscarriage of justice excep-
tion applies only if the petitioner claims actual innocence
of either the offense itself or of an aggravating circum-
stance that was the basis of a capital sentence' 4 Watkins
did not claim actual innocence, and thus the court of
appeals found that Watkins was entitled to no exception
from the rule against new introductions of evidence at the
federal habeas level.
4'
From a defense perspective, the court's implication
that a trial court's denial of a continuance to develop evi-
dence may qualify as "cause" under Correll and Keeney is
important.Trial counsel must be extremely vigilant in mak-
ing motions on the record, in objecting on the record if
denied, and in raising the issue at each level of appeal.As
Ronald Watkins' case unfortunately shows, failure to con-
sistently raise the issue in subsequent appeals can lead to
procedural default.
H. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Watkins made four assertions of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. First, Watkins argued that it was inef-
fective assistance of counsel for his attorney to fail to
strike Lennie Clark from the jury. During voir dire it
was discovered that Ms. Clark was related to an indi-
vidual who had been murdered. The court of appeals
looked to Strickland v. Washington12 for the standard
on ineffective assistance of counsel. In paraphrasing
Strickland, the court stated that a "petitioner must
show that counsel's performance was deficient, that it
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
that the grossly deficient performance actually preju-
diced the petitioner."4 13 The court further stated that "a
challenged action is ineffective assistance only if it can-
not be considered sound trial strategy under the wide
range of reasonable professional conduct: 4 Under this
standard, the court stated that Watkins' counsel's deci-
17Id.
n3d.
11513 U.S. 298 (1995).
10Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *6 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at
321).
411d.
42466 U.S. 668 (1984).
O
3Watkins, 1998WL 2861, at *7.
44Id.
sion not to strike Ms. Clark was not ineffective assis-
tance of counsel for two reasons. First, the attempt to
strike would, according to the court, mostly likely have
been futile because under Virginia law, "the mere fact
that a juror is related to a victim in an unrelated case
does not disqualify that juror."45 Second, because the
juror was black, the same race as Watkins, the court
stated that defense counsel could reasonably have
thought that the juror would have been more favorably
disposed toward Watkins. 6
Watkins' second claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel concerned the testimony of Dr. Centor, a foren-
sic psychologist who had interviewed Watkins and later
testified in rebuttal that Watkins would represent a
future danger. Quoting Estelle v. Smith47 for the holding
that "a defendant has a Fifth and Sixth Amendment right
to be notified that a psychiatric evaluation by the state
may be used against him at sentencing,"48 Watkins
asserted that it was ineffective assistance of counsel for
his attorney not to object to Dr. Centor's testimony
because such notice was lacking. In response, the court
of appeals cited Savino v. Murray"9 for the proposition
that when a defendant invokes Virginia Code section
19.2-264.3:1 to receive the services of a mental health
expert, 50 the section "operate[s] to notify the defense
that its decision to introduce psychiatric testimony
constitutes a waiver of the defendant's right to remain
silent during examination by the Commonwealth's
11Id. See Mackall v. Commonwealth, 372 S.E.2d 759,767,236
Va. 240,252 (1988) (mother of juror was recent rape victim).
4Id.
47451 U.S. 454 (1981).
18Watkins, 1998WL 2861 at *8.
4982 E3d 593 (4th Cir. 1996).
5Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1 states in pertinent part:
A. Upon (1) motion of the attorney for a defendant
charged with or convicted of capital murder and (ii)
a finding by the court that the defendant is finan-
cially unable to pay for expert assistance, the court
shall appoint one or more qualified mental health
experts to evaluate the defendant and to assist the
defense in the preparation and presentation of
information concerning the defendant's history,
character, or mental condition, including (I)
whether the defendant acted under extreme mental
or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense;
(ii) whether the capacity of the defendant to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law was signifi-
cantly impaired at the time of the offense; and (iii)
whether there are any other factors in mitigation
relating to the history or character of the defendant
or the defendant's mental condition at the time of
the offense.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (Michie 1950 & Supp. 1996)
(emphasis added).
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mental health examiner."51 Accordingly, the court of
appeals stated that both "Watkins and his counsel had
actual notice of Dr. Centor's examination through the
court's order before the trial,"52 rendering any objection
to Dr. Centor's testimony by Watkins' counsel futile, and
thereby placing the lack of objection outside the realm
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
5
1
Watkins' third assertion of ineffective assistance of
counsel regarded the actions of his counsel during closing
argument in the penalty phase. Although Watkins' counsel
referred to Watkins as "a monster" and "vile" in front of the
jury, the court of appeals found that these statements fell
within the permissible "wide range of reasonable profes-
sional conduct." Defense counsel had attempted to show
that death was not an appropriate punishment forWatkins,
because although "'the Ronald [Watkins] on the street is a
monster,'"" "'the Ronald in the penitentiary ... [is] a Ronald
that can live and is a Ronald that does not deserve to die."56
The court of appeals' holding in Watkins demonstrates the
extremely wide range of defense counsel action that the
court is willing to label as effective assistance of counsel.
Watkins' last assertion of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel regarded his counsel's failure to object to statements by
the prosecutor during closing argument of the penalty
"Savino, 82 E3d at 604. Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.3:1
states in pertinent part:
E. In any case in which a defendant charged with capital
murder intends, in the event of conviction, to present tes-
timony of an expert witness to support a claim in mitiga-
tion relating to the defendant's history, character or men-
tal condition, he or his attorney shall give notice in writ-
ing to the attorney for the Commonwealth, at least twen-
ty-one days before trial, of his intention to present such
testimony. In the event that such notice is not given and
the defendant tenders testimony by an expert witness at
the sentencing phase of the trial, then the court may, in
its discretion, upon objection of the Commonwealth,
either allow the Commonwealth a continuance or, under
appropriate circumstances, bar the defendant from pre-
senting such evidence.
E 1. If the attorney for the defendant gives notice pur-
suant to subsection E and the Commonwealth there-
after seeks an evaluation concerning the existence or
absence of mitigating circumstances relating to the
defendant's mental condition at the time of the
offense, the court shall appoint one or more qualified
experts to perform such an evaluation. The court
shall order the defendant to submit to such an evalu-
ation, and advise the defendant on the record in court
that a refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth's
expert could result in exclusion of the defendant's
expert evidence.
Va Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(E) and (F) (Michie 1950 & Supp.
1996) (emphasis added).
12Watkins, 1998WL 2861, at *8.
53Id.
-Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *7.
'lId. at *8 (quoting J.A. at 346).
5Id. at *8 (quoting J.A. at 347).
phase, where the prosecutor stated that "Watkins did not
show any remorse during trial ... :5 Watkins alleged that
the statement violated his Fifth Amendment right against
self incrimination by commenting on his decision not to
testify at trial. However, the court of appeals held that the
prosecutor"clearly keyed his remarks aboutWatkins'lack of
remorse to his demeanor in the courtroom" 59 and that the
jury "would [not] naturally have taken these comments as
highlighting Watkins' failure to take the stand:O It is per-
missible for the prosecutor to refer to defendant's
demeanor as showing a lack of remorse, but it is a violation
of the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination for
the prosecutor to refer to a defendant's lack of expression
of remorse.
m. Informing the Jury of Minimum Mandatory
Sentence
Watkins claimed it was error for the trial court to refuse
to allow him to inform the jury that, if sentenced to life in
prison, he would serve a mandatory minimum of 20 years
before becoming eligible for parole.After quickly mentioning
the rule of Lockett v. Ohio,6 whereby the jury must consider
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record or any of the
characteristics of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death,"6 the court went on to
look at whether Simmons v. South Carolina applied in this
case. In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that
where the state seeks the death penalty based upon the future
dangerousness of the defendant, it is a violation of defen-
"Watkins, 1998WL 2861, at *9.
53No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or pub-
lic danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
U.S Const. amend.V
"9Watkins, 1998WL 2861,at "10.
60d.
61438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
61Watkins, 1998WL 2861, at *10 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at
604).
6 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
'In Virginia, the future dangerousness aggravator is found in
Virginia Code Section 19.2- 264.4(C), which states in pertinent
part:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the
Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior his-
tory of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the offense of which he is accused that
he would commit criminal acts of violence that would con-
stitute a continuing serious threat to society....
Va. Code.Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1950 & Supp. 1996).
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dant's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process65 rights for the
trial court to keep from the jury knowledge of defendant's
parole ineligibility. Watkins sought to extend the Simmons
holding to his own situation, where a life sentence carried the
possibility of parole after twenty years.6 The court of appeals
did not reach the substance of Watkins' assertion, however,
because in O'Dell v. Netherland,67 the United States Supreme
Court held that Simmons was a new rule under Teague v.
Lane.63 Therefore, subject to narrow exceptions which did
not apply toWatkins' case, Simmons could not be retroactive-
6 See note 25,supra.
nFor a discussion of jury misconceptions regarding the mean-
ing of a life sentence, see Jenio, "Life"=Life: Correcting Juror
Misconceptions, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 4 0 . (1997).
67117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997). See Case Summary of O'Dell, Cap. Def.
J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 4 (1997).
-489 U.S. 288 (1989).
ly applied. The court of appeals observed that Watkins' con-
viction became final in 1989, five years before Simmons, and
thus that Simmons did not apply to Watkins' case.6The United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that the Simmons rule
was a new rule with respect to the legal landscape of 1988
(and presumably prior to that), and therefore, that all convic-
tions which became final prior to 1989 are not subject to
Simmons. Although not explicitly stated in O'Dell, it is unlike-
ly that the Court would find the Simmons rule to be an"old"
rule at any time before the decision of Simmons itself, in 1994.
Summary and analysis by:
Craig B. Lane
"Watkins v.Angelone, No. 97-9,1998WL 2861, at *11 (4th Cir.
Jan. 7, 1998) (citing O'Dell, 117 S.Ct at 1973).
A MODEST PROPOSAL: REQUIRING PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
FOR UNADJUDICATED ACTS OFFERED TO PROVE FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
BY: TOMMY BARRETt
L Introduction
At the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the
Virginia statutory scheme requires the Commonwealth to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of two statu-
tory aggravating factors.' In proving the future dangerous-
ness aggravator, the Virginia statute permits the
Commonwealth to introduce, and the jury or court to con-
sider, evidence of "the history and background of the defen-
dant." 2 This language has been interpreted to include evi-
dence of "unadjudicated acts,' i.e. criminal acts allegedly
committed by the defendant for which the defendant was
never tried or possibly even charged.' Unadjudicated acts,
'Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995).This section per-
mits the death penalty to be imposed if Commonwealth proves
that"there is a probability that the defendant would commit crim-
inal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society"- what is commonly referred to as "future dan-
gerousness" aggravator. Alternatively, the death penalty may be
imposed if the Commonwealth proves that the defendant's con-
duct in committing the instant offense was "outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravi-
ty of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim"-what is com-
monly referred to as the "vileness" aggravator. Vrginia Code
Section 19.2-264.4(C) requires the Commonwealth to prove either
or both aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt.
2Va. CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 1995). See alsoVa. Code
Ann. § 19.2- 264.4(C), stating that a finding of future dangerousness
may be based on "evidence of the prior history of the defendant'
'Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225Va. 289,298,302 S.E.2d 520,
526 (1983).
to be admissible, need only demonstrate a probability that
the defendant would commit future criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a future danger to society.
Unlike previous journal articles that have discussed the
use of unadjudicated acts in capital sentencing, 4 this one
focuses solely on the Due Process requirement of height-
ened reliability in capital sentencing. The Supreme Court
has recognized two principles, individualized sentencing
and heightened reliability, as constitutionally necessary for
any capital sentencing scheme.The Virginia capital sentenc-
ing scheme embraces the principle of individualized sen-
tencing by permitting the jury or court to consider all rele-
vant evidence, including unadjudicated acts of violence
allegedly committed by the defendant.The Virginia scheme
has, however, neglected the constitutional requirement of
heightened reliability. Neither the Virginia capital sentenc-
ing statute nor the Supreme Court of Virginia requires the
sentencer to find that the defendant in fact committed the
unadjudicated acts of violence by any standard of proof.The
4See Fenn, Anything Someone Else Says Can and Will be Used
Against You in a Court of Law: The Use of Unadjudicated Acts in
Capital Sentencing, Cap. Def. Dig.,Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31 (1993) (con-
sidering generally the use of unadjudicated acts in capital sentenc-
ing and suggesting trial strategies to minimize their effect);
Mclndoe, Is A Standard of Proof Required for the Evaluation of
UnadjudicatedActs in Capital Sentencing?, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 9, No.
2, p. 52 (1997) (arguing that a recent Supreme Court case implicit-
ly requires a capital jury to find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant committed the unadjudicated acts before
relying upon such evidence in assessing future dangerousness).
